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Green Politics, Expertise, and Democratic Discourse in the Two Germanies, 1989-2019
Carol Hager, Environmental Studies, Bryn Mawr College
Abstract: Environmental movements became a major vehicle for promoting citizen participation
in both East and West Germany during the 1980s. Their critiques of industrial society, however,
reflected the different constellations of power in their respective countries. Movements in both
East and West formed green parties, but their disparate understandings of power, expertise, and
democracy complicated the parties’ efforts to coalesce during the unification process and to play
a major role in German politics after unification. I propose that the persistence of this East-West
divide helps explain the continuing discrepancy in the appeal of Alliance 90/The Greens in the
old and new German federal states. Nevertheless, I also suggest that the Greens have
accomplished their goal of opening technical issue areas—particularly energy—to political
debate. This is currently working to enhance their image throughout Germany as champions of
technological innovation and democratic openness in the face of climate inaction and right-wing
populism.
Keywords: democracy, East-West differences, environmental movements, expertise, Greens

The thirtieth anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall and reunification provides scholars of
German politics an opportunity to revisit our analyses from that tumultuous time and to evaluate
how they have held up in the intervening decades. This paper takes as its starting point a research
project on environmental movements I conducted in Berlin, Leipzig, and Wittenberg from 1989
through 1991. My research focused on the relationship between environmental activism,
technology, and democracy. I found that this relationship differed in fundamental ways in East
and West, and the differences helped explain the movements’ failure to coalesce during the
unification process.1 I have often thought these same factors might help explain the subsequent
development of Alliance 90/The Greens as the ultimate “Wessi party”2 and its inability to win a
following in the new federal states. In this article I briefly describe the evolution of different
environmentalisms in East and West Germany during the 1980s and their contributions to the
formation of the Greens. I will then examine the trajectory of the party in the old and new federal
states up to the present. I will discuss how the Greens’ recent upswing in polling throughout

Germany reveals the extent to which they have influenced political discourse along the lines of
both eastern and western movements.

Origins: Two Germanies, Two Societal Critiques

Environmental movements arose in West Germany in the 1970s and East Germany in the 1980s.
In the former, environmental activism often took the form of “citizen initiative” groups. These
were single-issue local groups that originally formed either in order to procure some service for
the community (e.g. day care) or, increasingly from the early 1970s on, to protest large, statesponsored industrial projects (e.g. power plants). They were “new social movements” organized
not along traditional lines of economic conflict, but around new issues of quality of life and a
critique of growth.3 Citizen initiatives reached their zenith with the antinuclear movement. By
the mid 1970s, more people identified themselves as members of citizen initiative groups than of
all political parties combined.4 Environmental initiatives were by far the largest subgroup.
Importantly, their protest against particular projects grew into Systemkritik against what they
perceived as an undemocratic planning process.5
The movements’ critique was reminiscent of Max Weber’s thesis on the subordination of
politics to bureaucratic expertise in advanced democratic states. In Weber’s account, bureaucracy
develops as part of the modernization of democratic states, in response to demands for equality
before the law. The politician satisfies societal demands for political responsibility and
flexibility. But technical superiority gives the expert greater claim to authority and becomes a
tool for enhancing bureaucratic power. The more that essentially political questions are
formulated as technical imperatives and assigned to the bureaucracy, the weaker the citizens’

influence over their own governance becomes. The politician stands as a “dilettante” opposite the
trained expert, essentially rubber-stamping decisions (s)he has little role in formulating.
Industry’s influence expands because its technical information is essential to the authority of the
bureaucracy.6
Environmental citizen initiatives protested lack of citizen access to the planning process –
particularly for nuclear power projects - and an overreliance on technical expertise. They rejected
established political parties, defining them as part of the problem, and they began to form their
own voting lists. The national-level Greens were founded in 1980 and first entered the Bundestag
in 1983. Petra Kelly famously referred to them as “the anti-party party;” others described them as
the parliamentary arm of the citizen initiative movement. Their aim was to shed light on the
workings of political institutions in order to democratize decision making. They called for public
deliberation rather than technocratic decision making. There were multiple ideological strands
within the early Greens that ranged from left to right, but this critique, which they inherited from
the citizen initiative movement, was one of the defining features of their politics in office. The
Greens implemented several practices designed to avoid professionalization and keep their
parliamentarians tied to the grass roots. The rotation principle required parliamentary
representatives to leave office after two years (half of their term) and be replaced by other party
members. The imperative mandate required them to represent the views of the party base rather
than exercising their own judgment on votes.
The Greens supported citizen participation in issue areas with high technical content –
such as nuclear power - as a means to democratize technical discourse. They did not reject
expertise per se—rather, they rejected the government’s alleged tendency to mask political
questions as technical imperatives and withdraw them from public discussion. The Greens

fostered the development of "counterexpertise", in which critical citizens reevaluated the goals,
assumptions, and data contained in studies authored by the scientific establishment.
The societal critique advanced by East German environmental movements was very
different. In the German Democratic Republic (GDR), no open criticism of the ruling SED
government was permitted. The Party tried to co-opt any private activity that might become
political. Environmental damage was endemic in East Germany. Concerned citizens began to
organize in study groups affiliated with the Protestant Church. Religion was virtually the only
sphere of private activity tolerated by the regime, and these groups provided a nonpolitical
setting in which people could discuss their ideas. Among other themes, church-affiliated study
groups conducted discussion evenings about progress, science, and technology.7
GDR

environmental groups at first focused on activities such as bicycle trips and forest

walks. In 1982, the government forbade the publication of environmental data. Church-affiliated
groups responded by trying to collect data themselves or to acquire it from Western groups.
Environmental information centers sprang up, including the Umweltbibliothek (environmental
library) in East Berlin, which printed its own newsletters. In order to minimize infiltration by the
Ministry for State Security (Stasi), the groups remained small, locally centered, and largely
independent of each other. They gradually began to attract people disillusioned with the political
system who had no legitimate outlet for airing their grievances. By the mid 1980s, they were
beginning to take on a more overtly critical tone, especially after the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear
accident and a Stasi raid on the Berlin Umweltbibliothek the following year.8
The Chernobyl accident was a watershed event for environmental movements in both
Germanies, but it had different effects in each. In the West, it turned an already skeptical
population firmly and permanently against nuclear power. It bolstered the movements' critique of

the CDU/FDP coalition's piecemeal approach to environmental hazards and helped pressure the
Kohl government into founding the Ministry for Environment, Nature Protection, and Nuclear
Safety later that year.9 In the East, it strengthened a gathering wave of distrust in government
authorities. Their initial silence, followed by reassurances that no fallout had reached the GDR,
were impossible to reconcile with the news that most citizens were receiving from Western
broadcast sources. Moreover, the explosion of a Soviet-made reactor gave the lie to Soviet and
East German experts' claim of technological superiority.10
East German groups were generally less critical of technology, and of technical expertise,
than their West German counterparts.11 As in the Federal Republic (FRG), environmental issues
in the GDR became a vehicle for Systemkritik. The East German elite, however, owed their
positions not to expertise, but to party loyalty. According to their ideology, the state followed
immutable scientific rules to arrive at the good society. But the discrepancy between the official
information and the visible environmental degradation became so great that it delegitimated the
regime in the eyes of many citizens. “Whereas West German groups attacked the technocratic
aspect of their state, however, East German groups attacked the apparent irrationality of theirs.”12
By 1989, environment was one of the main themes of protest in the GDR and was linked
with critiques of authoritarianism. To protesters, environmental destruction was a direct result of
the lack of citizen voice in governance. The Green Party was founded in November 1989 by 150
members of grassroots environmental groups. It was one of several environmental organizations
formed in the waning days of the GDR. It was not founded as an anti-party party, but rather was
dedicated to opposing the “Stalinist treatment of human beings, economy, and environment.”13
The outsider/insider identity of the Western movements seemed self-defeating to my
interviewees from the East.

Thus, both movements that eventually contributed to Alliance 90/The Greens demanded
democratization, but democracy meant different things to them. For Western environmentalists,
it meant a decentralized, participatory politics in which deliberation could counter bureaucratic
secrecy. Eastern environmentalists found themselves facing too much politics—a system in
which Party functionaries overrode experts and had no mechanism for listening to the public. For
them, democratization meant functioning representative institutions, along with neutral experts.
Hence, while FRG groups rejected technical expertise as a basis for political power, GDR groups
seemed to propose that very thing as a remedy for the arbitrariness of one-party rule.

An Incomplete Unification

After Honecker’s resignation and the fall of the Berlin Wall, many GDR protest groups wanted to
help form their own government. Honecker's successors invited opposition groups, including the
Green Party and other environmental organizations, to join a "Roundtable", whose charge was to
make (nonbinding) recommendations for political reform. The Roundtable's first public
statement put environmental issues first: "[the participants] demand disclosure of the ecological,
economic, and financial situation in our country."14 After the March 1990 East German elections,
however, in which the large, West-based parties triumphed, it was clear that quick reunification
of the two Germanies would be the path chosen. GDR environmental groups were generally
unenthusiastic about reunification, and their FRG counterparts were wary of imposing themselves
on their Eastern counterparts and disenfranchising them.15 The Eastern and Western groups
could not agree on a merger in advance of the December 1990 Bundestag elections, so they ran
separately (under the special rules of this election, the new federal states formed a separate

voting unit). In the West, the internally divided Greens focused on issues such as climate change
and failed to clear the 5 percent hurdle. In the East, the Green Party allied with other grassroots
groups to form the Green Party/Alliance 90, which won 6 percent of the vote and entered the
Bundestag with only eight members.
Eastern and Western Greens eventually did merge to form Alliance 90/The Greens, but
their disagreements revealed fundamental differences in perspective that set the tone for the next
decades. The Western perspective—a Systemkritik of late capitalist democracy—prevailed, as
West Germany had essentially absorbed the GDR. The party regrouped in the old federal states
and struggled for relevance in the new ones. Alliance 90/The Greens became almost exclusively
a western German party at the national level, clearing the 5 percent hurdle only rarely in federal
elections in any eastern state but solidifying its support in the west, especially in the city-states
(Hamburg, Bremen, Berlin) and in Baden-Württemberg, where it regularly polled over 10
percent (see Figure 1).

Figure 1 - Vote Percentages for Alliance 90/The Greens in Bundestag Elections (second
ballot) by Federal State
Carol Hager and Alicia Peaker. Data source: bundeswahlleiter.de

The environmental groups that had contributed to Alliance 90 in the new federal states
felt excluded from the conversation. Their own evolution in secret had hampered the
development of a grand ideology or guiding philosophical critique to complement that of the

West. Their approach had been pragmatic and results-oriented. Although environmental issues
took a backseat to economic issues after unification, the former remained salient in the eastern
states. For example, whereas 82 percent of respondents in one large survey had deemed “a clean
and intact environment” to be “very important” in 1990, by 1995 the figure was 65 percent, still
a majority.16 But the west-centeredness of the Greens in united Germany made it difficult for the
party to gain a foothold in the east. The Greens struggled to rise much above the 5 percent cutoff
in the eastern state legislatures as well. In its leadership, the party also remained largely western.
Katrin Göring-Eckardt, a Green member of the Bundestag since the late 1990s, was the only top
politician in the party from eastern Germany. It is striking, she says, that “some in our party
know the eastern United States better than eastern Germany.”17

The Evolution of Green Politics in United Germany

In the ensuing decades, four related trends have gradually changed this picture. First, the Greens
began to take an active role in governance. They carried deep ideological divisions into the
Bundestag that dated back to the party’s founding. Fundis argued that entering into governing
coalitions and fostering the professionalization of parliamentary representatives would be
tantamount to abandoning Systemkritik—they wanted to maintain a position outside the center of
power in order legitimately to critique it. Realos, by contrast, took a more pragmatic position,
urging the party to prepare itself to govern. Indeed, the Greens entered their first state-level
governing coalition in Hessen in 1985. The December 1990 election debacle prompted a
reckoning within the party. Many argued that the structures designed to keep MPs tied to the
grass roots had hampered the Greens' ability to respond quickly to changing political

circumstances.18 The Greens discarded the imperative mandate and the rotation principle, a move
that resulted in the exodus of prominent Fundis from the party.
The ideological tensions between the Fundi and Realo wings were essentially settled in
favor of the Realos by the time the Greens entered into a governing coalition with the Social
Democrats (SPD) at the national level in 1998. In the meantime, they have formed governing
coalitions with all other parties except the right-wing populist AfD and, since 2011, have been
the senior partner in a Green/Black (CDU) coalition in the state of Baden-Württemberg.
The Greens began to translate their positions into policy change. Counterexpertise,
popularized by the citizen initiative movement and incorporated into the federal government by
the Greens, came to fruition in the German energy debate. Twenty-seven scientifically trained
antinuclear activists had founded the Eco-Institute in Freiburg in 1977, which first coined the
term “Energiewende” (energy turning point). At the time of its founding, there was no real place
at universities or established research institutions for experts who did not share the government
and industry elite’s support for nuclear and fossil fuel energy.19 The Eco-Institute gave a home to
critical scientists dedicated to questioning the politics behind expert opinion and opening energy
policy to broader societal discussion. It was a 1980 Eco-Institute book that proposed the thenrevolutionary idea that future economic growth would not require ever-expanding energy
consumption, and that future German energy needs could be met without coal or nuclear
power.20
The Greens helped bring these alternative scientific viewpoints into public debate. Their
efforts resulted in policy innovation, particularly during the Red (SPD)-Green government
(1998-2005). Among the Greens-led policy changes of that period are the Renewable Energy
Sources Act (EEG), aided by the advocacy of prominent SPD member Hermann Scheer, and the

agreement to phase out nuclear power by 2022. The EEG promoted a model for energy transition
that was decentralized, technologically forward-looking, and enormously popular. It was based
on a feed-in tariff, which enabled small producers to feed electricity into the grid for a
guaranteed price over a 20-year period. It gave priority grid access to renewable energy and
resulted in a boom particularly in small-scale solar installations. A major reason the
Energiewende is so popular is that it gives individuals the opportunity to do something for and
with their communities. This kind of local investment has increased community solidarity and
helped against negative demographic change, a particularly salient issue in Germany's eastern
states.21 The Energiewende has also showed some promise in reconciling environmental and
economic issues in the new federal states. Citizen energy companies are viewed as a means to
bring new, environmentally friendly businesses to areas with high unemployment.22
Having gained seats in the 2002 federal elections, the Greens successfully pushed the
coalition to move federal responsibility for renewable energy from the skeptical Economics
Ministry to the more supportive Environment Ministry. This move also had the symbolic purpose
of framing energy supply in terms of environmental protection (the Greens' calling card) rather
than economic growth.
After the Red-Green coalition dissolved in 2005, subsequent CDU-led coalitions have
been less friendly to renewable energy. Moreover, the SPD, in coalition with the CDU, has
become a less reliable supporter of green policies. When the Merkel administration attempted to
shift federal support from renewables to coal and to backtrack on the commitment to end nuclear
power, however, the announcements were met with a wave of protest. Mass demonstrations
followed the chancellor's apparent reversal in early 2011 of her commitment to decommission
Germany's aging nuclear power plants. The Fukushima disaster in Japan shortly thereafter sent

tens of thousands more antinuclear activists into the streets. Merkel's apparent waffling
contributed to the CDU's loss of two state elections that year, resulting in a Red/Green coalition
in Rhineland-Palatinate and a Green/Red (and eventually Green/Black) coalition in BadenWürttemberg. In the new German states, the Greens also gained ground, doubling their share of
the vote in Saxony-Anhalt (to 7.1%) and entering the state parliament (Landtag) for the first time
in Mecklenburg-Vorpommern.23
The political backlash forced Merkel's reluctant government to recommit to ending
nuclear power by 2022 and to accelerate the timetable for the Energiewende. The Merkel
administration did succeed in moving responsibility for renewable energy back to the Economics
Ministry in 2013. But its attempts since 2014 to recentralize energy production, partly in order to
bolster Germany's large utilities, which had failed to invest in renewables and had largely been
left out of the boom, have provoked renewed protest.24 The German public clearly prefers the
Greens' participatory, decentralized model. The government was compelled to list "preserving
the diversity of participants" as a primary goal of subsequent revisions of the EEG, and it is
roundly criticized when it falls short of this goal in practice.25
Due in part to the ambitious nature of the Energiewende, Germany has become a model
of forward-looking environmentalism. As Andrei Markovits writes, the Greens in government
have fundamentally remade Germany’s “brand” in their own image: “Nobody vaguely sane and
with any kind of political ambition would speak ill of the environment. Being green on this
dimension has become tantamount to being a good citizen, a good German, a good European.”26
This translates into continued very high public support for the Energiewende. In a September
2019 survey by the German Agency for Renewable Energy, for instance, 89 percent of

respondents agreed that stronger use and expansion of renewable energies are “very or
extraordinarily important” (66 percent) or “important” (23 percent).27
The second key trend favoring the Greens is the decline of the center-right and center-left
Volksparteien (catch-all parties) in recent decades. In Western Europe, party alignment had
already weakened noticeably by the 1980s.28 The strength of left-wing parties was eroded by a
shift in the workforce from blue-collar to white-collar employees and the gradual weakening of
the trade union movement. Even where working class-affiliated parties remained electorally
strong, explains Martin Schain, “their ties to their working-class base became less secure and
more conditional on their policy agenda.”29 At the same time, Christian Democratic parties in
Europe were experiencing a loosening of bonds with their voters due to the weakening of
Christian religious identities.30
This trend is visible in the decline in adherence to both the SPD and the Christian
Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU/CSU). Particularly the SPD has seen its voter base
shrink after multiple terms as the junior partner in the Union/SPD national coalition (2005-2009,
2013 to present). Both parties seem depleted in the final years of the Merkel government. While
the Greens are not the only beneficiaries of this development, it makes them appear as a realistic
alternative.
The third important trend, related to the weakening of the Volksparteien, is the rise of
right-wing populist groups, including PEGIDA, (Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of
the Occident), founded in Dresden in 2014, and the Alternative for Germany party (AfD), which
formed in opposition to the federal government’s euro rescue policy and first gained a following
among Euroskeptics. During the 2015 refugee crisis it began presenting itself as an anti-refugee
alternative to the CDU. While the AfD grew rapidly in both old and new federal states, it had a

special appeal for the “forgotten” eastern Germans who felt left behind in the decades since
unification.31
The danger in the rising appeal of right-wing populist parties, writes Martin Schain, is
that they shift the political conversation of the entire party system in their direction.32 In 2016,
for example, CSU chief Horst Seehofer was widely criticized for pandering to potential AfD
voters when he split with Chancellor Merkel on the issue of refugees and immigration. In 2018,
fearing a loss of voters to the AfD in the upcoming Bavarian state elections, the CSU again took
a hard line, this time nearly upsetting the national governing coalition. As it turned out, the CSU
did decline in Bavaria, falling below 40% in the Landtag for the first time since 1954.33
The Greens have resisted this trend, and they have benefited from taking the clearest
stand of any German party against the AfD. They have waged explicitly anti-AfD, pro-diversity,
pro-Europe, liberal campaigns, and it has paid off for them. In the aforementioned 2018 Bavarian
election, they nearly doubled their share of the vote, becoming the second largest party faction
with 17.6% and outpolling the AfD (10.2%) by a wide margin. They are winning young urban
voters in the west and now in the east. “There are a lot of people who don’t want the east to be
perceived solely as a region where right-wing populists and Nazis set the tone,” says a Green
member from Brandenburg.34 Their voter base is much different from that of the AfD. Whereas
the latter’s core supporters are overwhelmingly working-class males, the Greens are the only
German party whose base is majority female. They have the second highest income range (after
the Free Democrats, FDP). They, along with SPD and Left Party, are supported more strongly in
urban areas. And, while the age of their average voter has risen over time, at forty-eight it is still
younger than the average SPD or FDP voter.35

Finally, the Greens’ influence has been enhanced by the advent of climate change as a
dominant issue throughout Germany. Put simply, the Greens own the climate change issue.
Weather extremes in Germany in recent years, including severe storms, flooding, prolonged heat
waves/drought and wildfires, have affected everyone and have convinced even skeptics that
climate change is an emergency. The Greens, champions of counterexpertise and the
Energiewende, have been proven prescient. They bucked the scientific establishment when it was
politically risky to do so, and their priorities now align more closely with those of the German
public than ever before.
This development has caught the CDU/CSU-SPD coalition flat-footed as the Merkel
government struggles to explain its recent actions to prolong the use of coal and its failure to
achieve its own carbon emission targets. Just before the 2019 European Parliament elections, a
twenty-six-year-old German named “Rezo” posted a YouTube video called “Destruction of the
CDU,”

which immediately went viral and was partially blamed for the party’s subsequent poor

showing. The video panned the governing coalition’s climate policy for flying in the face of
scientific expertise.36 Rezo’s critique is reminiscent of the East German protests of the 1980s, in
which the supposed experts were unmasked as technically incompetent. Now that same
accusation is leveled against the grand coalition government. In this issue area at least, it has
ceded credibility on science to the Greens and their allies. “We are the only credible party for
action on climate change,” says a Brandenburg Green leader.37

From Störenfried to Stabilizer: Environmentalism, Expertise, and Democracy Today

These four related developments have all contributed to a recent bump in support for the Greens
throughout Germany and, for the first time, in the new federal states. Although they are far
outpolled by the AfD there, their support is rising sharply. From January to August 2019, party
membership surged 27 percent in Saxony, 26 percent in Brandenburg, and 22 percent in
Thuringia, the three eastern states that held elections in 2019.38 The Greens are clearing the 5
percent hurdle more often in the Landtage of the new federal states. They will now likely be part
of government in all but one of them, partly because no other parties will coalesce with the AfD.
In addition to these four in the east, they are currently part of the governing coalitions in seven of
the western Landtage for a total of eleven.
In addition to the decline of the Volksparteien and their opposition to the AfD, the
relationship between environmentalism, expertise, and democracy has evolved in a manner that
goes some way toward reconciling the east-west divide in Green support. The Weberian critique
that put off eastern German environmentalists has largely fallen away as the party has gained
experience in governance. Grassroots democracy, one of the four pillars of the Greens’ original
platform, is no longer implemented through the rotation principle or the imperative mandate,
things that gave credibility to the anti-party party moniker but hindered the party’s capacity to
govern. The Greens have not completely abandoned their idealism, but they now lead with their
pragmatism. As Markovits puts it: “The Greens have become established without being the
establishment.”39
The environment took a backseat to economic issues in the new federal states after
unification, but, through the lens of climate change and the energy transition, they are
increasingly viewed more as two sides of the same coin. Economic regeneration, if it happens,
will happen through technologically progressive development. In the May 2019 EU elections, the

Greens were polling as Germany’s most popular political party, winning 22.6 percent of the vote.
They even received 29 percent of the eighteen to twenty-nine year-old vote, more than double
the second-place CDU/CSU total. This group tends to identify climate change as the most
important political issue.40 The Greens are benefiting from their reputation for being socially and
technologically forward-looking. In a sense, their steering of the technical conversation satisfies
both western and eastern environmentalists’ critiques from 1989—it has moved the conversation
into the political realm (west), and the Greens and their allies are the experts (east).
It is ironic, says political science professor Werner Weidenfeld, that the party that was
once a symbol of radical change has now come to represent stability: “The Greens do not really
fundamentally change the political course of Germany anymore, they much rather stabilize it.
For example, when the other parties started questioning European integration, it was the Greens
who declared themselves in favor of a strong Europe in all clarity.”41 While it remains to be seen
how the Greens will evolve in the future, their current position is testament both to how much
they have shaped Germany’s political course and to how much they in turn have been shaped by
it.
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